The Inventions of Rome

For vast numbers of people, Roman Catholicism is the religion of choice. Rome can be attractive for a wide variety of reasons. The most significant is familial, people born into and persevering in the Roman Church. But other attractions of various sorts can be readily found: theological, philosophical, liturgical, moral, psychological, and historical.

Defenders of Protestantism over the centuries have entered the lists, confronting at great length all of Rome's attractions. Understandably, the discussions have often focused particularly on biblical and theological arguments. But historical arguments are of great importance as well. Rome often claims that it represents two thousand years of unbroken apostolic succession and practice. The implication is that no fundamental changes have taken place in the church, but only a legitimate development of principles found at the beginning. I believe that this historical claim is profoundly false, and that in the interests of truth and biblical religion it must be challenged.

The Roman Catholic Church today is at least the fourth or fifth iteration of that organization, each in basic ways different from the others. There is the ancient form, the medieval form, the Tridentine form (formed at the time of the Council of Trent, 1545–1563), and then at least two post-Tridentine forms shaped by two very different councils: Vatican I (1868–1870) and Vatican II (1962–1965). In its ancient form, Rome was in fellowship with the other Christian churches and held to Nicene orthodoxy. In its medieval form, it separated from other Christian churches insisting on absolute Roman supremacy, defining certain doctrines such as transubstantiation, but leaving many other doctrines (such as justification and the authority of tradition) open to discussion. In its Tridentine form, it defined many more doctrines, cutting itself off from its medieval form by condemning views it had then tolerated. In its post-Tridentine forms, it theoretically upholds the decisions of Trent, but in practice moves beyond and contrary to Trent. As the Tridentine church claimed to supplement the Bible with tradition, but in fact used its traditions to contradict the Bible, so the post-Tridentine church has claimed to supplement Trent with other teachings, but in fact has used those other teachings to contradict Trent.

The extensive claims of the previous paragraph cannot be elaborated or substantiated in the space of this article. My purpose is simply to present some of the statements of the sixteenth-century Council of Trent and the nineteenth-century First Vatican Council in which historical claims for the Roman church are made, and then evaluate those claims in light of history.

Scripture and Tradition

In the sixteenth century, the Reformers taught that the Bible alone was the church's ultimate authority, while the Roman Catholics responded that tradition along with Scripture were the authority for the church. The Council of Trent defined this Roman position in these terms:

This position continued to characterize the Tridentine church as it was reiterated in almost identical language by the First Vatican Council (1870). (2) In the decrees of these two councils, we read nothing of evolving or developing traditions. Instead, the historical claim made by each is crystal clear: the authoritative traditions of the Roman Church were taught by the apostles in the first century. Such a claim is entirely untenable, as any informed Roman Catholic must acknowledge today. And so many Roman apologists now seek to show how current Roman teachings and practices, supposedly based on tradition, have progressed and grown from a kernel of truth found in the time of the apostles, and thereby justify contemporary practice. The problem with such an apologetic is that it contradicts what Trent and the First Vatican Council declared.

John Calvin, in one of the most trenchant early criticisms of Trent, remarkably turned the table on Rome saying, in effect, that he would accept the authority of apostolic tradition as defined by Trent if the Romanists could offer historical proof for their claims of tradition. Calvin recognized already in the sixteenth century that such proof could not be presented. (3) Historical studies since then have made Trent's claims even more impossible to demonstrate.

As we examine the decisions of Trent carefully, we find various places in which it claims the authority of tradition as the foundation of its teaching, particularly with respect to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

Transubstantiation
Trent teaches that its doctrine of transubstantiation is not only a perpetual, but also a sincere and firm commitment of the church even in ancient times:

Adoration of the Host
Trent also teaches that worshipping the consecrated bread and wine of the Lord's Supper is an apostolic tradition going back to the earliest days of the church:

Sacrifice of the Mass
Remarkably, Trent also declares both that the Mass was an unbloody, propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the living and the dead, and that this was the consensus of the apostolic tradition:

Suffice it to say, no reputable church historian would confirm any of these historical claims of the Council of Trent. Even if some very ancient support for some of these teachings were found, it would not substantiate Trent's claims of clear and broad acceptance of them in the early period of the ancient church.

Scripture and Its Interpretation

In addition to its decisions on tradition, Trent further decreed that only the church could properly interpret the meaning of the Bible, and further claimed that this position was the unanimous teaching of the church fathers:

The position articulated by Trent against sola scriptura has rightly sometimes been called sola ecclesia (by the church alone). It is not so much the Bible and tradition that determine the truth as the decisions of the church as to the meaning of the Bible and tradition. Here too, however, Rome's claim is not that its teachings have evolved, but that it teaches what the whole church and the fathers of the church have always taught. Calvin saw that in fact Rome did not give any real authority to the Bible. Rather, Rome made the Bible into a wax nose that would be reshaped to mean whatever Rome wanted it to mean. (8)

Calvin indeed recognized an important role for the church in interpreting the Bible, but has a very different notion of what the church is. For Rome, the church is the authoritative hierarchy that by its power decides the meaning of the Bible. For Calvin, the interpretation of the Bible in difficult matters should be given to learned members of the church to study the meaning of the Bible humbly and submissively. (9)

The question remains, of course, as to who exactly determines the meaning of the Bible and tradition for the Roman Catholic Church. Some in the sixteenth century looked to the great theological faculties in the universities. Many believed that only the pope and ecumenical councils could speak for the whole church. That is the view enshrined in the Tridentine Profession of Faith of 1564, issued by Pope Pius IV after the Council of Trent had adjourned and made binding on all who taught in the Roman Church. (10) This profession declared the necessity of following the pope and the ecumenical councils:

The point to take note of here is that the Tridentine Profession of Faith assumes the authority of the ecumenical councils as well as popes, and further, assumes the agreement of popes and councils. In fact, the historical reality is quite the contrary to Rome's claims, for the pope historically rejected what ecumenical councils said about Rome.
Consider the famous sixth canon of the Council of Nicaea (325):

Clearly the Council of Nicaea knew nothing of the notion that the bishop of Rome ruled over all the churches. Obstinately, Rome has not submitted to this canon of an ecumenical council, thus challenging the notion of pope-and-council harmony.

A second and more surprising example can be taken from the second ecumenical council of Constantinople (381). At that time, the bishop of Constantinople was declared to have "the precedence in honor, next to the bishop of Rome." (13) The meaning of this statement is explained more fully in the twenty-eighth canon of the fourth ecumenical council, the Council of Chalcedon (451). After expressing its agreement with the Council of Constantinople on the bishop of Constantinople, the canon continued:

The papal legates at the council protested this canon, but the council passed it anyway. Clearly the great ecumenical council did not acknowledge the right of the pope to determine its actions. Important to note is that for the council the discussion of the honor accorded to the bishop of Rome was purely a matter of its relation to the imperial system. No mention is made of Christ or Peter in this matter. This canon is also rejected by Rome, again challenging the notion that popes and councils have always agreed.

Vatican I and Papal Infallibility

In many ways, the logical culmination of Rome's claims for itself was the declaration of the First Vatican Council (1870) regarding the authority and infallibility of the pope. This council reiterated that what it taught about the pope was "in accordance with the ancient and constant faith of the universal Church." (15) Further, it insisted that the doctrine of papal authority over the whole church is necessary for salvation: "Hence we teach and declare that by the appointment of the Lord the Roman Church possesses a superiority of ordinary power over all other churches....This is the teaching of the Catholic faith, from which no one can deviate without loss of faith and salvation." (16)

The irony and historical inaccuracy of this statement is outrageous. To abide by this teaching, the Eastern churches and many Western churches of the ancient period are read out of the true church without a moment's hesitation. The absolute authority of the bishop of Rome is not only ancient and universal, one most held to be Roman Catholic, but it is also necessary for salvation for everyone.

The council goes beyond asserting the authority of the pope over all churches. It also declares that he is infallible in his official teaching. The more familiar section of the declaration is as follows: "Adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith...we teach and define...that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra...is possessed of that infallibility." (17) In context, the assertion about the pope is actually even stronger: "This See of holy Peter remains ever free from all blemish of error." (18) Has anyone ever believed that?

The pope who called and directed the First Vatican Council was Pius IX. In perfect harmony with the sentiments of the statements, when it was suggested to him that he at least seek the advice of bishops and the tradition of the church in matters of doctrine, Pius IX answered, "Tradition, I am tradition." (19) For the Tridentine Roman Church, its authority truly is sola papa (by the pope alone). The arrogance of Pius IX and his council is truly staggering. Few Roman Catholic scholars in the post-Tridentine church accept these sweeping claims as being either historical or binding.

The Ongoing Need for Reformation

Since Calvin's time, Rome has continued its defense of itself through complicated arguments full of distinctions made after the fact. I have quoted at length from two of Rome's own ecumenical councils to show how great is the distance between what the documents say and how Rome treats them. Rome's historical arguments are simply not credible, though most Roman Catholics either do not know them or do not think about them. Those that do know them in the end follow the founder of the Jesuits, Ignatius Loyola, who wrote: "If we wish to proceed securely in all things, we must hold fast to the following principle: What seems to me white, I will believe black if the hierarchical Church so defines." (20) Such a position is not worthy of a Christian or of biblical religion. (21)

And Furthermore...

“Take Augustine—the sine qua non of Calvinist theology. It is beyond dispute that Augustine taught the doctrine of free will. Yet you bring up his letters to Valentinus where he taught it and what’s the response? Foot shuffling, mumbling “well, he didn’t MEAN that” or “well he was wrong about that.””

This is the kind of comment that people make who really do not understand Reformed/Augustinian theology, but imagine that we all believe that mankind is nothing but a bunch of robots, with each muscle and each twitch being at the command of God. From the second letter,

“This is the reason why he said to you, “Turn not aside to the right hand, nor to the left;” in other words, do not uphold free will in such wise as to attribute good works to it without the grace of God, nor so defend and maintain grace as if, by reason of it, you may love evil works in security and safety,—which may God’s grace itself avert from you! Now it was the words of such as these which the apostle had in view when he said, “What shall we say, then? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?” And to this cavil of erring men, who know nothing about the grace of God, he returned such an answer as he ought in these words: “God forbid. How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?” Nothing could have been said more succinctly, and yet to the point. For what more useful gift does the grace of God confer upon us, in this present evil world, than our dying unto sin? Hence he shows himself ungrateful to grace itself who chooses to live in sin by reason of that whereby we die unto sin. May God, however, who is rich in mercy, grant you both to think soundly and wisely, and to continue perseveringly and progressively to the end in every good determination and purpose.” (Augustine, Letter 215).

“As for all others who, in the use of their free will, have added to original sin, sins of their own commission, but who have not been delivered by God’s grace from the power of darkness and removed into the kingdom of Christ, they will receive judgment according to the deserts not of their original sin only, but also of the acts of their own will. The good, indeed, shall receive their reward according to the merits of their own good-will, but then they received this very good-will through the grace of God” (Ibid).

We, of course, do not disagree with these sentiments at all, nor anything else that Augustine said in the letter, especially regarding the fact that those who sin, do so by the free determination of their own will, and it is not God who does it. And, again, that men who have been freed by Christ, have a responsibility to obey the commandments, and, in fact, they all do so, since it was God who gave them this “good-will” in the first place.

Or as Augustine puts it in another place, “All our good merits are only wrought in us by grace, and -when God crowns our merits, he crowns nothing but his own gifts.” (Augustine, Letter 194)

And again,

“Have just men, then, no merits? Certainly they have, because they are righteous. But they were not made righteous by merits. For they are made righteous when they are justified, but as the apostle says, they are justified freely by his grace.” (Ibid)

And again, it is the grace of God by which we have faith and good works, and not faith or good works that we receive grace. Nor do we merely receive grace as a means to assist us so that we can make the right choice, but rather, it is grace which changes our wills so that we make the correct choice, irresistibly:

“But these brethren of ours, about whom and on whose behalf we are now discoursing, say, perhaps, that the Pelagians are refuted by this testimony in which it is said that we are chosen in Christ and predestinated before the foundation of the world, in order that we should be holy and immaculate in His sight in love. For they think that having received God’s commands we are of ourselves by the choice of our free will made holy and immaculate in His sight in love; and “since God foresaw that this would be the case,” they say, “He therefore chose and predestinated us in Christ before the foundation of the world.” Although the apostle says that it was not because He foreknew that we should be such, but in order that we might be such by the same election of His grace, by which He showed us favour in His beloved Son. When, therefore, He predestinated us, He foreknew His own work by which He makes us holy and immaculate. Whence the Pelagian error is rightly refuted by this testimony. “But we say,” say they, “that God did not foreknow anything as ours except that faith by which we begin to believe, and that He chose and predestinated us before the foundation of the world, in order that we might be holy and immaculate by His grace and by His work.” But let them also hear in this testimony the words where he says, “We have obtained a lot, being predestinated according to His purpose who works all things.” (Ephesians 1:11) He, therefore, works the beginning of our belief who works all things; because faith itself does not precede that calling of which it is said: “For the gifts and calling of God are without repentance;” (Romans 11:29) and of which it is said: “Not of works, but of Him that calls” (Romans 9:12) (although He might have said, of Him that believes); and the election which the Lord signified when He said: “You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.” (John 15:16) For He chose us, not because we believed, but that we might believe, lest we should be said first to have chosen Him, and so His word be false (which be it far from us to think possible), “You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.” Neither are we called because we believed, but that we may believe; and by that calling which is without repentance it is effected and carried through that we should believe.” (Augustine, Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Ch. 38)

These same sentiments, from the will of the sinners being free to sin, to the will of man being changed by God so that he, by his own will, can do good, to finally the great truth that we choose Christ because Christ first chose us, is all beautifully found in Reformed sources:

“...we allow that man has choice and that it is self-determined, so that if he does anything evil, it should be imputed to him and to his own voluntary choosing. We do away with coercion and force, because this contradicts the nature of the will and cannot coexist with it.” (Calvin, Bondage and Liberation of the Will)

Though this is quite a different view from the popular idea of free will, which rather thinks that the will of man is somehow neutral, and therefore can either live in sin or do good, rather than being inclined from an evil will to a good will by God. Since Calvin goes on to say:

“We deny that choice is free, because through man’s innate wickedness it is of necessity driven to what is evil and cannot seek anything but evil. And from this it is possible to deduce what a great difference there is between necessity and coercion. For we do not say that man is dragged unwillingly into sinning, but that because his will is corrupt he is held captive under the yoke of sin and therefore of necessity will in an evil way. For where there is bondage, there is necessity. But it makes a great difference whether the bondage is voluntary or coerced. We locate the necessity to sin precisely in corruption of the will, from which follows that it is self-determined.” (Ibid)

Augustine repeats this same position in his own place, here:

“But this part of the human race to which God has promised pardon and a share in His eternal kingdom, can they be restored through the merit of their own works? God forbid. For what good work can a lost man perform, except so far as he has been delivered from perdition? Can they do anything by the free determination of their own will? Again I say, God forbid. For it was by the evil use of his free-will that man destroyed both it and himself. For, as a man who kills himself must, of course, be alive when he kills himself, but after he has killed himself ceases to live, and cannot restore himself to life; so, when man by his own free-will sinned, then sin being victorious over him, the freedom of his will was lost. For of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage. This is the judgment of the Apostle Peter. And as it is certainly true, what kind of liberty, I ask, can the bond-slave possess, except when it pleases him to sin? For he is freely in bondage who does with pleasure the will of his master. Accordingly, he who is the servant of sin is free to sin. And hence he will not be free to do right, until, being freed from sin, he shall begin to be the servant of righteousness. And this is true liberty, for he has pleasure in the righteous deed; and it is at the same time a holy bondage, for he is obedient to the will of God. But whence comes this liberty to do right to the man who is in bondage and sold under sin, except he be redeemed by Him who has said, If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed? And before this redemption is wrought in a man, when he is not yet free to do what is right, how can he talk of the freedom of his will and his good works, except he be inflated by that foolish pride of boasting which the apostle restrains when he says, By grace are you saved, through faith.” (Augustine, he Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, Chapter 30. Men are Not Saved by Good Works, Nor by the Free Determination of Their Own Will, But by the Grace of God Through Faith.)

Thus from the Reformed/Augustinian view, man is free to sin. Though, to do what is right, he must be freed by Christ to do so, who, by His grace, works in us both to will and to do of His good pleasure. Thus the freedom of the will to do good, which before hand could only do evil, is the gift of God Himself:

“And further, should any one be inclined to boast, not indeed of his works, but of the freedom of his will, as if the first merit belonged to him, this very liberty of good action being given to him as a reward he had earned, let him listen to this same preacher of grace, when he says: “For it is God which works in you, both to will and to do of His own good pleasure;” and in another place: “So, then, it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy.” Now as, undoubtedly, if a man is of the age to use his reason, he cannot believe, hope, love, unless he will to do so, nor obtain the prize of the high calling of God unless he voluntarily run for it; in what sense is it not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, except that, as it is written, “the preparation of the heart is from the Lord?” Otherwise, if it is said, “It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy,” because it is of both, that is, both of the will of man and of the mercy of God, so that we are to understand the saying, “It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy,” as if it meant the will of man alone is not sufficient, if the mercy of God go not with it—then it will follow that the mercy of God alone is not sufficient, if the will of man go not with it; and therefore, if we may rightly say, it is not of man that wills, but of God that shows mercy, because the will of man by itself is not enough, why may we not also rightly put it in the converse way: “It is not of God that shows mercy, but of man that wills, because the mercy of God by itself does not suffice?” Surely, if no Christian will dare to say this, It is not of God that shows mercy, but of man that wills, lest he should openly contradict the apostle, it follows that the true interpretation of the saying, “It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy,” is that the whole work belongs to God, who both makes the will of man righteous, and thus prepares it for assistance, and assists it when it is prepared.” (Augustine, he Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, Chapter 32. The Freedom of the Will is Also the Gift of God, for God Works in Us Both to Will and to Do.)

However, when Augustine/Reformed theologians say that the sinner is free to sin, we do not mean this absolutely, as if God does not lift one finger, but lets chaos reign over all the Earth. As Augustine explains, though it is in the power of man to sin, yet...

“It is, therefore, in the power of the wicked to sin; but that in sinning they should do this or that by that wickedness is not in their power, but in God’s, who divides the darkness and regulates it; so that hence even what they do contrary to God’s will is not fulfilled except it be God’s will. We read in the Acts of the Apostles that when the apostles had been sent away by the Jews, and had come to their own friends, and shown them what great things the priests and elders said to them, they all with one consent lifted up their voices to the Lord and said, “Lord, you are God, which hast made heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein; who, by the mouth of our father David, your holy servant, hast said, Why did the heathen rage, and the peoples imagine vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes were gathered together against the Lord, and against His Christ. For in truth, there have assembled together in this city against Your holy child Jesus, whom You have anointed, Herod and Pilate, and the people of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and counsel predestinated to be done.” See what is said: As concerning the gospel, indeed, they are enemies for your sakes. Because God’s hand and counsel predestinated such things to be done by the hostile Jews as were necessary for the gospel, for our sakes.” (Augustine, Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Ch. 33)

Likewise, when we say that Christians by their own determination have the power to do good, we do not mean that they do this without the grace of God. Hence the famous prayer by Augustine from his Confessions, “Give me what you command and command what you will.” We also do not say that it is in the power of the Christian to utterly reject Christ, since All that the Father has given to the Son do come to the Son, and of these none are ever lost who were true members of the elect. Or as Augustine puts it,

“But of such as these [the Elect] none perishes, because of “all that the Father has given Him, He will lose none.” (John 6:39). Whoever, therefore, is of these does not perish at all; nor was any who perishes ever of these. For which reason it is said, “They went out from among us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would certainly have continued with us.” (John 2:19). (Augustine, Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints, Ch. 33)

And again,

“Those who, by the all-foreseeing appointment of God, are foreknown, predestinated, called, justified and glorified, are the children of God, not only before they are regenerated, but before they are born of woman; and such can never perish... Because God works all things together for the good of such; and He so makes all things thus to work together for their good, that if some of them go out of the way, and even exceed all bounds, He makes even this to work for their good and profit; for they return to Him more humble and more teachable than before.” (Augustine, Qtd in Calvin’s Treatise of the Eternal Predestination of God)

Nor do we claim that this grace of God is given universally in any way, or that God is unjust in giving it or not giving it. But we say, with Augustine, that He gives it to whom He will; and when He gives it, it is in mercy that He gives it. And when He does not give it, it is in judgment that He gives it.

“And, moreover, who will be so foolish and blasphemous as to say that God cannot change the evil wills of men, whichever, whenever, and wheresoever He chooses, and direct them to what is good? But when He does this He does it of mercy; when He does it not, it is of justice that He does it not for “He has mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens.” And when the apostle said this, he was illustrating the grace of God, in connection with which he had just spoken of the twins in the womb of Rebecca, who “being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of Him that calls, it was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger.” And in reference to this matter he quotes another prophetic testimony: “Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.” But perceiving how what he had said might affect those who could not penetrate by their understanding the depth of this grace: “What shall we say then?” he says: “Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid.” For it seems unjust that, in the absence of any merit or demerit, from good or evil works, God should love the one and hate the other. Now, if the apostle had wished us to understand that there were future good works of the one, and evil works of the other, which of course God foreknew, he would never have said, not of works, but, of future works, and in that way would have solved the difficulty, or rather there would then have been no difficulty to solve. As it is, however, after answering, God forbid; that is, God forbid that there should be unrighteousness with God; he goes on to prove that there is no unrighteousness in God’s doing this, and says: “For He says to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.” “ (Augustine, The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, Chapter 98. Predestination to Eternal Life is Wholly of God’s Free Grace.)

“And if that wasn’t bad enough, the almost monomaniacal reliance on St. Augustine completely ignores the teaching of the Greek Fathers—which no Christian has any right to do. Augustine himself—like any Father—cannot be judged on his own but in relation to the totality of the tradition. If St. Augustine can’t be squared with the Greek, Syrian and Egyptian Fathers then we darn well ought to be suspicious of why.”

I consider these kinds of statements to be fantasy fueled arrogance.

For example, on Sola Scriptura

“Have thou ever in your mind this seal, which for the present has been lightly touched in my discourse, by way of summary, but shall be stated, should the Lord permit, to the best of my power with the proof from the Scriptures. For concerning the divine and holy mysteries of the Faith, not even a casual statement must be delivered without the Holy Scriptures; nor must we be drawn aside by mere plausibility and artifices of speech. Even to me, who tell you these things, give not absolute credence, unless thou receive the proof of the things which I announce from the Divine Scriptures. For this salvation which we believe depends not on ingenious reasoning , but on demonstration of the Holy Scriptures.” (Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. Lecture 4, Ch. 17)

On justification by faith without the working of the law:

“For this is [the righteousness] of God when we are justified not by works, (in which case it were necessary that not a spot even should be found,) but by grace, in which case all sin is done away. And this at the same time that it suffers us not to be lifted up, (seeing the whole is the free gift of God,) teaches us also the greatness of that which is given. For that which was before was a righteousness of the Law and of works, but this is the righteousness of God.” (John Chrysostom, Homily 11 on Second Corinthians, 2 Cor 5:21)

“By what law? Of works? Nay, but by the law of faith. See he calls the faith also a law delighting to keep to the names, and so allay the seeming novelty. But what is the law of faith? It is, being saved by grace. Here he shows God’s power, in that He has not only saved, but has even justified, and led them to boasting, and this too without needing works, but looking for faith only.” (Homily 7 on Romans II)

“All these, therefore, were highly honoured, and made great, not for their own sake, or for their own works, or for the righteousness which they wrought, but through the operation of His will. And we, too, being called by His will in Christ Jesus, are not justified by ourselves, nor by our own wisdom, or understanding, or godliness, or works which we have wrought in holiness of heart; but by that faith through which, from the beginning, Almighty God has justified all men; to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.” (Clement of Rome, 1st Epist. to the Corinthians, ch. 32.)

Chrysostom against intercessory prayer from the Saints, including Mary

“There is to thee no need of mediators in audience with God; nor of that much canvassing; nor of the fawning upon others; but even if thou be destitute, even if bereft of advocacy, alone, by thyself, having called on God for help, thou wilt in any case succeed. He is not so wont to assent when entreated by others on our behalf, as by ourselves who are in need; even if we be laden with ten thousand evil deeds. For if in the case of men, even if we have come into countless collisions with them, when both at dawn and at mid-day and in the evening we show ourselves to those who are aggrieved against us, by the unbroken continuance and the persistent meeting and interview we easily demolish their enmity — far more in the case of God would this be effected.” (NPNF1: Vol. IX, Concerning Lowliness of Mind and Commentary on Philippians 1:18, Homily 3, §11.)

And again,

“It was then from this motive that He said in this place, “Woman, what have I to do with thee?” and also for another reason not less pressing. What was that? It was, that His miracles might not be suspected. The request ought to have come from those who needed, not from His mother. And why so? Because what is done at the request of one’s friends, great though it be, often causes offense to the spectators; but when they make the request who have the need, the miracle is free from suspicion, the praise unmixed, the benefit great. So if some excellent physician should enter a house where there were many sick, and be spoken to by none of the patients or their relations, but be directed only by his own mother, he would be suspected and disliked by the sufferers, nor would any of the patients or their attendants deem him able to exhibit anything great or remarkable. And so this was a reason why He rebuked her on that occasion, saying, “Woman, what have I to do with thee?” instructing her for the future not to do the like; because, though He was careful to honor His mother, yet He cared much more for the salvation of her soul, and for the doing good to the many, for which He took upon Him the flesh.” (NPNF1: Volume XIV, Homilies on the Gospel according to St. John, Homily XXI, §3.)

And again,

” You see, provided we are prepared to be vigilant and alert, even by our own appeals we will obtain the greatest benefit. After all, since our Lord is loving, he does not accede to requests on our behalf by others as readily as he does to our own. See the extraordinary degree of his goodness: if he sees us giving offence, suffering dishonor, having no confidence, and then gradually rising from our depression and wishing to have recourse to the riches of his loving kindness, he immediately accedes to our requests, extends his hand to us in our abjection and raises us where we have fallen, crying aloud, “Surely the fallen will not fail to rise?” (FC, Vol. 82, Homilies on Genesis, trans. Robert C. Hill, Homily 44.11 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990), p. 460.)

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