Posted on 11/14/2002 3:13:31 PM PST by The Grammarian
WE propose in this chapter, to examine some of the principal objections which have been urged against the view taken in the preceding chapter of the freedom of the will. Those most worthy of notice are the following, viz.:
I. It is said to be absurd in itself.
II. It is said to be irreconcilable with the Scripture account of the divine prescience.
III. It is said to conflict with the doctrine of motives.
We propose a respectful attention to each of these grand objections.
I. It is alleged that the view we have taken of the proper freedom of the will is absurd in itself.
President Edwards has argued at great length, that the self-active power of the mind in the determination of the will, as contended for by Arminians, is absurd in itself, because it implies a preceding determination of the will to fix each free volition, and that this would imply an infinite series of volitions, which is absurd.
President Day, of Yale College, who seems to be an apt disciple of Edwards, has, in a late work on the Will, highly complimented the treatise of Edwards, as having furnished in this argument an unanswerable refutation of the Arminian notion of freedom. And truly we must say that the position, "that if each active volition is necessarily preceded by another, this would imply an infinite series, and consequently be absurd," is a matter so obvious, that the numerous pages devoted by the learned author to this subject might have been spared. Indeed, he seems to have labored and proved, to an extent almost beyond endurance, a position which no intelligent mind can dispute. Had he shown the same solicitude for the establishment of his premises, and been equally successful in that particular, there could be no objection to his conclusion.
That the Arminian notion of the self-active power of the mind in determining the will, implies that each volition must be preceded by another volition, is what has been asserted, but has never yet been proved. The advocates of necessity, although they admit that by the self-determining power of the will is meant "the soul in the exercise of a power of willing," yet, when they engage in argument, appear to forget this admission, and proceed as though the will were supposed to be an agent separate and distinct from the mind or soul in the act of willing. Hence they involve the discussion in confusion, and bewilder the mind in amaze of verbal contradiction and absurdity. In every act of the will, let it be distinctly understood that the mind or soul is the agent, and the will is only expressive of the act or state of the mind or soul at the time and under the condition, of willing.
Now let us inquire if every act of the soul in willing must, according to the Arminian notion of freedom, be preceded by another act of the soul in willing. Why is it that there can be no choice or act of willing performed by the mind itself, unless it is preceded by another act that determines it? Surely a choice preceded by another choice which determines it, is no choice at all; and to say that every free act, or self-determined act, must be preceded by another, by which it is determined, is the same as to say that there can be no free, or self-determined act. And this is the very point in dispute that ought to be proved, and not taken for granted. Indeed, we may directly deny it, and make our appeal to common sense to sustain us in the position.
For illustration, we refer to the first vicious choice ever made by man. Now, let us contemplate the history of this matter as it really transpired. The tempter came to man for the first time, and presented the seducing bait. Man willed to disobey. Here we see but one act of the mind. There is not an act determining to choose the evil, and then another consequent act choosing the evil. The act determining to choose is really choosing. Determining to choose in a certain way, and choosing in that way, are the same thing. Now to say that Adam could not, in the exercise of his own powers, independent of a predetermining cause operating upon him, choose between the evil and the good, is the same as to say that God could not make a free agent.
Indeed to say that a choice free from the necessary determination of a preexisting cause cannot exist, is the same as to say that there is not a free agent in the universe, and that the Deity himself cannot possess self-determining power, but is only acted upon by the impulse of fatality. If the Deity cannot choose or will without something external to himself determining his will, where are his self-existence and independence? For, if the divine will is always determined by something external to the divine mind that wills, then there must be something existing prior to all the divine volitions, separate and distinct from the Deity himself.
Again: if it be admitted that the divine mind can will or choose freely without being acted upon by a preceding choice, then it follow that it is not absurd in itself for the mind to determine its own acts, independent of necessary preceding causes. If it be admitted that the Deity can will by the free exercise of his own powers, then the only question will be, Can he confer this exalted power upon a creature? If we deny that he possesses it himself, we destroy his self-existence and independence. If we deny his ability to confer this power upon a creature, we deny his omnipotence.
Then the whole question concerning the absurdity of the Arminian doctrine of the self-determining power of the will, resolves itself into a question concerning the divine power. Necessitarians contend that God cannot create a free, self-determining agent; and Arminians deny the assertion, and appeal to the self-existence and independence of the Deity to disprove the absurdity in the case; and rely upon the omnipotence of God to prove that the creation of moral agents in the divine image, so far as the self-determining power of the mind is concerned, is not impossible. To say that God cannot make a free agent capable of determining within himself his own volitions, is to limit the divine power.
But Edwards again contends that "this self-determining power of the will implies the absurdity of an effect without a cause." We deny the charge. We are not obliged to admit that became the will is not determined in every case by a preceding act of the will, or some previous cause external to the mind itself, that therefore there is no cause in the case. By no means. If the mind wills one way instead of another, there must be a cause for it; but that cause must not necessarily be either preceding or external, as necessitarians contend. It may be both simultaneous and internal—that is, it may originate in the mind itself at the time of willing.
If it be said that "then the mind itself must be the cause of its own volitions, and if so, there must always be a previous something in the mind to determine it to will in one way instead of another," we reply, truly the mind is the cause of its own volitions, to such extent that they are not necessarily determined independently of its own action; but it does not follow that there must be something previously existing in the mind, necessarily determining it to choose as it does. All the previously existing cause essential in the case is, the capacity of the mind, in the exercise of its powers, to will at the time, either the one way or the other. If the causative power exists in the agent or mind to effectuate either one of two or more events or volitions, it matters not which one of these events or volitions may be produced, it will be as truly the resultant of an adequate cause as if the agent or mind had possessed no alternative power for producing another event or volition, instead of the one it did produce. Hence it is unphilosophical to say that a volition is uncaused, because the agent causing it had power to have caused another volition instead thereof. Our own consciousness testifies that we have the alternative power of willing or doing right or wrong; and our willing or doing either way does not prove that we might not have willed or done otherwise. In the exercise of this capacity, upon the principles of free agency, and not impelled by stern necessity, the particular will in a given case originates; and thus we see how it was in the case given of the first transgression.
Man had been endued with the power to choose, or to control, his own will. The tempter came: in the exercise of that power, man chose the evil. Here the cause was in himself, and originated in, and flowed from, the manner in which he exercised his powers. This manner of exercising his powers resulted, not necessarily, but contingently, from the nature of the powers themselves. He might have exercised them differently. The cause, or the determining power, was in himself. God placed it there; and for God to place it there to be exercised contingently for good or evil, implies no more absurdity, so far as we can see, than for God to have placed the cause in something preceding, external, and necessary. And thus we think the doctrine of free agency is successfully vindicated from the charge of absurdity and self-contradiction. So far from being absurd in itself, it presents the only consistent illustration of the divine attributes, and the only satisfactory comment upon the divine administration.
II. The next grand objection to the doctrine of free agency is, that it is supposed to be irreconcilable with the Scripture account of the divine prescience. Necessitarians argue that free agency, in the proper sense, implies contingency; and that contingency cannot be reconciled with the divine foreknowledge. It is admitted by Arminians, and the advocates of free agency generally, that the foreknowledge of God extends to all things great and small, whether necessary or contingent—that it is perfect and certain. The only question is, whether this foreknowledge implies necessity. That whatever God foreknows certainly will take place, we are free to acknowledge; but that this certain foreknowledge implies absolute necessity, is what we deny, and what, we believe, cannot be proved. All the arguments we have seen adduced for that purpose are based upon the supposition that certainty and necessity are synonymous. Now, if we can show that they are separate and distinct things, and that certainty does not imply necessity, the objection under consideration must fall to the ground.
We remark, in the first place, that this objection labors under the serious difficulty that, while it aims to destroy the free agency of man, it really would destroy the free agency of God. For, if whatever is foreknown as certain must also be necessary, and cannot possibly be otherwise, then, as God foreknew from eternity every act that he would perform throughout all duration, he has, all the while, instead of being a free agent, acting after the "counsel of his own will," been nothing more than a passive machine, acting as acted upon by stern necessity. This conclusion is most horribly revolting; but, according to the argument of necessitarians, it cannot possibly be avoided. And if we are forced to the conclusion that God only acts as impelled by necessity, and can in no case act differently from what he does, then it must follow that necessity or fate made and preserves all things; but is it not obvious that this doctrine of necessity, as applied to the Deity, is most glaringly absurd? To suppose that the great Jehovah, in all his acts, has been impelled by necessity, or, which is the same thing, that he has only moved as he was acted upon, is to suppose the eternal existence of some moving power separate and distinct from the Deity, and superior to him; which would be at once to deny his independence and supremacy. We cannot, then, without the most consummate arrogance and absurdity, admit the position that all the acts of the Deity are brought about by necessity. Yet they are foreknown; and if, as we have seen, God's foreknowledge of his own acts does not render them necessary, and destroy his free agency, how can it be consistently argued that God's foreknowledge of the acts of men renders them necessary, and destroys their free agency?
Again, let us contemplate the subject of foreknowledge in relation to the actions of men, and see what evidence we can find that it implies necessity. It has been contended that God cannot foreknow that a future event certainly will take place, unless that event necessarily depends upon something by which it is known. "The only way," says President Edwards, "by which any thing can be known, is for it to be evident; and if there be any evidence of it, it must be one of these two sorts, either self-evidence or proof: an evident thing must be either evident in itself, or evident in something else." This he lays down as his premises, from which he proceeds to argue that God cannot foreknow future events, unless they are rendered absolutely necessary. That his premises, and the reasoning based upon them, may hold good in reference to the knowledge of man, we do not question; but that they apply to the foreknowledge of the Deity, cannot be shown.
If man foreknows any thing, that foreknowledge must result from a knowledge of something now existing, between which and the event foreknown there is a necessary connection. But is it legitimate to infer that because this is the case with man, it must also be the case with God? Have we a right to measure the Holy One by ourselves? Indeed, to infer the necessity of all things from the divine prescience, is to limit the perfections of Jehovah. It is to say either that God could not constitute any thing contingent, or that, after having so constituted it, he cannot foreknow it. Either hypothesis would argue a limitation to the perfections of God.
This subject, we think, may be rendered plain by a careful reflection on the nature of knowledge. What is it? Is it an active power, possessing a distinct independent existence? We answer, No. It is passive in its nature, and possesses only a dependent and relative existence. It can exist only in the mind of an intelligent being. Knowledge, as such, can exert no immediate and active influence on any thing whatever.
It has been said that "knowledge is power;" but it is not implied by that expression that it is a power capable of exerting itself. All that is implied is, that it directs an active agent in the manner of exerting his power. What effect, I would ask, can my knowledge of a past event have upon that event? Surely none at all. What effect can my knowledge of a future event have upon it? Considered in itself, it can have no influence at all. Is there any event, whether past, present, or future, on which the mere knowledge of man can have any influence? Certainly there is none. Knowledge is a something existing in the mind. It has its seat there, and of itself it is incapable of walking abroad to act upon extraneous objects. I would therefore ask, What effect can the divine knowledge have on a past or present event? Is it not obvious that it can have none? The knowledge of God does not affect the faithfulness of Abraham, or the treachery of Judas, in the least. Those events would still continue to have occurred precisely as they did, if we could suppose all trace of them to be erased from the divine mind. And if we could suppose that God was not now looking down upon me, could any one believe that I would write with any more or less freedom on that account? Surely not. If, then, knowledge, considered in all these different aspects, is passive in its nature, how can we rationally infer that its passivity is converted into activity so soon as we view it in the aspect of the divine prescience?
But it will doubtless be argued that although the foreknowledge of God may not render future events necessary, yet it proves that they are so. To this we reply, that it proves that they are certain, but cannot prove that they are necessary. But still, it will be asked, where is the difference? If they are certain, must they not therefore be necessary? That we may illustrate the distinction between certainty and necessity, we will refer to the crime of Judas in betraying the Saviour. Here we would say it was a matter certain in the divine mind, from all eternity, that Judas would commit this crime. God foreknew it. Although it was also foretold, yet it was not rendered any the more certain by that circumstance; for prediction is only knowledge recorded or made manifest; but knowledge is equally certain, whether secret or revealed. The pointed question now is, Could Judas possibly have avoided that crime? Was he still a free agent? and might he have acted differently? or was he impelled by absolute necessity? We answer, he could have avoided the crime. He was still a free agent, and might have acted differently.
Here it will no doubt be argued that if he had avoided the crime, the foreknowledge of God would have been defeated, and the Scriptures broken. To fairly solve this difficulty, and draw the line between certainty and necessity, we answer, that if Judas, in the exercise of the power of free agency with which he was endued, had proved faithful, and avoided the crime in question, neither would the foreknowledge of God have been frustrated, nor the Scriptures broken. In that case, the foreknowledge of God would have been different, accordingly as the subject varied upon which it was exercised. God could not then have foreknown his treachery; and had it not been foreknown, it never could have been predicted. A free agent may falsify a proposition supposed to announce foreknowledge, but cannot falsify foreknowledge; for if the agent should falsify the proposition, that proposition never could have been the announcement of foreknowledge.
The truth is, the prediction depends on the foreknowledge, and the foreknowledge on the event itself. The error of the necessitarians on this subject is, they put the effect for the cause, and the cause for the effect. They make the foreknowledge the cause of the event, whereas the event is the cause of the foreknowledge. No event ever took place merely because God foreknew it; on the contrary, the taking place of the event is the cause of his having foreknown it. Let this distinction be kept in mind, that, in the order of nature, the event does not depend on the knowledge of it, but the knowledge on the event, and we may readily see a distinction between certainty and necessity. It is certain with God who will be saved, and who will not; yet it is likewise certain that salvation is made possible to many who, according to the certain prescience of God, never will embrace it. God has made some things necessary, and some things contingent. Necessary events he foreknew as necessary—that is, he foreknew that they could not possibly take place otherwise. Contingent events he foreknew as contingent—that is, he foreknew that they might take place otherwise. And thus, we think, foreknowledge and free agency may be harmonized, human responsibility maintained, and the divine government successfully vindicated.
III. We will now consider the objection to the view taken of free agency, which is founded upon the doctrine of motives.
Necessitarians have relied with great confidence on their arguments from this source. In illustrating their views of the doctrine of motives, they have chosen different figures, all amounting substantially to the same thing—leading necessarily to the same conclusion.
Dr. Hartley has represented the thoughts and feelings of the soul as resulting from the various vibrations of the brain, produced by the influence of motives, or surrounding circumstances. He admits frankly that his scheme implies "the necessity of human actions;" but he says, "I am sorry for it, but I cannot help it."
Lord Kames represents the universe as "one vast machine composed of innumerable wheels, all closely linked together, and moving as they are moved." Man he considers as "one wheel fixed in the middle of the vast automaton, moving just as necessarily as the sun, moon, or earth."
President Edwards has represented "motives and surrounding objects as reaching through the senses to a finely-wrought nervous system, and, by the impressions made there, necessarily producing thought, volition, and action, according to the fixed laws of cause and effect."
According to all these three general systems, the conclusion in reference to the influence of motives, etc., is the same—that is, it appears that the mind is like a machine or a pair of scales, only a passive substance, moving as it is acted upon by force applied to the wheel, or weight to the scale. Here is the leading principle in the systems of all the advocates of philosophical necessity; and upon this grand point the advocates of free agency join issue.
That we may see distinctly the point upon which the issue is made, we may here observe that advocates on both sides have very frequently mistaken or misrepresented the views of their opponents. First, then, let it be understood that necessitarians, by motives as influencing the will, do not maintain that the strongest motive, considered in reference to its real and proper weight, always prevails; but, by the strongest motive they understand the motive having the greatest influence over the individual at the time, and under all the circumstances of the case. This is the same as saying that the prevailing motive always prevails; which is only the assertion of a simple truism, which no one can dispute.
The point, therefore, in which the matter of controversy is involved, is not whether the strongest motive, considered in reference to its real weight, always prevails. This, necessitarians are misrepresented, if they are charged with holding. Nor is it in dispute whether the strongest motive, considered in reference to its influence over the individual at the time and under the circumstances, always prevails. This the advocates of free agency do not deny, for that would be the same as to deny that the prevailing motive is the prevailing motive. Nor is it a matter of dispute whether motives and surrounding circumstances have any influence in determining the will. That they do have a powerful influence, metaphorically speaking, none can deny.
What, then, we ask, is the real point of dispute? It is simply this: Do motives presented to the mind, and surrounding circumstances, have an efficient, absolute, and irresistible influence over the will, so as in all cases to make it necessarily what it is? This is the real and the only point in the doctrine of motives on which the controversy turns. Necessitarians affirm on this question, and the advocates of free agency deny. We will endeavor impartially to examine the question.
That we may understand the true doctrine concerning the influence of motives on the will, we observe, 1. God the Creator must have possessed within himself the power of action, otherwise creation never could have taken place; for, previous to creation, nothing existed but God, and consequently if he could only act as acted upon by something external to himself, as there was nothing in the universe but himself, he must have remained forever in a state of inaction, and creation could not have originated. Now it must be admitted, either that God has created beings capable of acting without being necessarily acted upon by something external to themselves, or he has not. If he has not, then it will follow that there is but one agent in the universe, and that is God; and angels and men are only patients, no more capable of self-motion than a clod or a stone. This theory at once destroys the distinction between matter and mind, is directly repugnant to the whole tenor of Scripture, and most recklessly subversive of the plainest dictates of common sense! And yet it will appear that it is the only theory consistent with the views of necessitarians on the subject of motives.
Now let us take the opposite position, and suppose, according to common sense and Scripture, that two distinct classes of substances have been created—material and immaterial. In other words, that God has not only created dead, inanimate matter, capable only of moving as it is moved, but that he has also created intelligent beings, endued with self-moving energy, capable, not of themselves, but in the exercise of their derived powers, of voluntary action, independent of external and necessary force, and it will be at once apparent that there is a radical and essential distinction in nature between lifeless matter and these intelligent beings. If this distinction be admitted, which cannot possibly be denied while the voice of common sense or Scripture is allowed to be heard, then it will follow that lifeless matter and intelligent beings are regulated by laws as different as are their essential natures.
Here we find the origin of the grand metaphysical blunder of necessitarians of every school, and of every age. They have made no distinction between matter and mind. The ancient Manichees, the Stoics, the atheistic and deistic philosophers, Spinoza, Hobbes, Voltaire, Hume, and others, have been followed, in this confounding of matter and mind, by many learned and excellent men, such as President Edwards of Princeton, and President Day of Yale College.
Indeed, the whole treatise of Edwards, in which he has written three hundred pages on the human will, is based upon this blunder. His almost interminable chain of metaphysical lore, when clearly seen in all its links, is most palpably an argument in a circle. He assumes that the mind is similar to matter, in order to prove that it can only act as acted upon; and then, because it can only act as acted upon, he infers that, in this respect, the mind, like matter, is governed by necessity. Although he turns the subject over and over, and presents it in an almost endless variety of shape, it all, so far as we can see, amounts to this: The mind, in its volitions, can only act as it is acted upon; therefore the will is necessarily determined. And what is this but to say that the will is necessarily determined, because it is necessarily determined? Can any real distinction be pointed out between the labored argument of Edwards and this proposition? But we shall soon see that this assumed position—that the mind can only act as it is acted upon—is philosophically false, This grand pillar upon which the huge metaphysical edifice has been reared, may be shown to be rotten throughout, yea, it may be snapped asunder by a gentle stroke from the hammer of reason and common sense; and then the edifice, left without foundation, must fall to the ground.
Let us now contemplate these motives which are said to act upon the mind so as necessarily to influence the will. Let us look them full in the face, and ask the question, What are they? Are they intelligent beings, capable of locomotion? Are they endued with a self-moving energy? Yea, more: Are they capable of not only moving themselves, but also of imparting their force to something external to themselves, so as to coerce action in that which could not act without them? If these questions be answered in the negative, then it will follow that motives, considered in themselves, can no more act on the mind so as necessarily to determine the will, than a world can be created by something without existence. If these questions be answered in the affirmative, then it will follow that motives at least are free agents—capable of acting without being acted upon, and endued with self-controlling and self-determining energy. Necessitarians may fall upon either horn of the dilemma; but upon which horn soever they fall, their system must perish.
If the attempt be made to evade this by saying that motives do not act themselves, but God is the agent acting upon man, and determining his will through the instrumentality of motives—if this be the meaning, then I demand, why not call things by their right names? Why attribute the determination of the will to the influence of motives, and at the same time declare that motives are perfectly inefficient, capable of exercising no influence whatever? Is not this fairly giving up the question, and casting "to the moles and to the bats" the revered argument for necessity, founded upon the influence of motives?
Again, to say that motives exercise no active influence, but are only passive instruments in the hands of God by which he determines the will by an immediate energy exerted at the time, is the same as to say that God is the only agent in the universe; that he wills and acts for man; and, by his own direct energy, performs every physical and moral act in the universe, as really and properly as he created the worlds; and then that he will condemn and punish men everlastingly for his own proper acts! Is this the doctrine of philosophical necessity? Truly it is. And well may we say this is fatalism! This is absurdity!
Now, let us turn from the absurdities of the necessitarian scheme, and see if we can perceive the true doctrine on the subject of motives. Suppose, as I pass the street, I perceive in the shop on my right the choicest liquors most invitingly displayed. I am tempted to drink to excess. I parley with the temptation. I long for the delicious wines. I think of the dreadful consequences of inebriety; but then returns my love of strong drink, and I determine in my will to yield myself up to intoxication. Here we perceive an act has been performed by which the will is fixed in a particular way; but the question is, Who is the agent in this act? Necessitarians would say the motive to intoxication has been the active agent, and man has been the passive instrument. But we ask, What motive, or what surrounding circumstance, in this case, has put forth active energy, so as not only to move itself without being acted upon, but also to communicate an irresistible impulse to something external to itself? Can the wines in the bottles exhibit their eloquent tongues, and plead with the passer-by to quaff them? Surely not. They are themselves as passive as the bricks in the wall. Can the love for strong drink assert a separate and independent existence, and rise up as an active agent, independent of the man, and use arguments with the understanding, and coercively determine the will? This is so far from being the case, that these motives have no existence itself, independent of the man. They only derive their existence through the exercise of the active powers of man; and shall it be said that they necessarily control those powers, and even that those powers cannot be exerted except as they are necessarily impelled by motives? Can motives be the cause and the effect in the same sense, at the same time?
The plain truth is, motives do not act themselves at all. It is the mind that acts upon them. They are passive, and only move as they are moved. The mind of man is the active agent that picks the motive up, turns it about, and estimates its weight. This will be rendered somewhat plainer when we reflect that two objects both passive can never act upon each other: some active power must first move the one, or it can never move the other. Suppose two blocks of marble placed near together in the same room: can the one arise up and impart a direct and resistless influence to the other, so as to cause it necessarily to change its place? Certainly not. And why? Simply because they are both passive. Now, as motives, arguments, and surrounding circumstances, are obviously passive in their nature, incapable of moving themselves, it necessarily follows that if the mind is also passive, the one cannot act upon the other—neither motives upon the mind, nor the mind upon motives. Hence, agreeably to the assertion of necessitarians, that the mind is passive, the will cannot be influenced by motives at all.
The fallacy of the reasoning of Edwards and others on this subject consists in their considering the influence attributed to motives as an independent and active influence, whereas motives are all the time passive, and are really acted upon by the mind, soul, or feelings of man. So far from motives actively determining the will, through the mind or soul, it is the mind or soul that determines the will, and, by its own active energy, gives to motives all the influence they possess.
This is evident from the very nature of motives. What are they? Are they not arguments, reasons, or persuasions? Now, if the mind can exercise no free agency of its own, in attending to arguments, examining reasons, or yielding to persuasions, why address them to man, and exhort him to give them their due weight? The very fact that they are motives, arguments, reasons, or persuasions, is proof sufficient that they are designed to influence the will, not necessarily and irresistibly, but only through the agency of man. So that when we admit that the motive having the greatest influence, at the time and under the circumstances, always prevails—or, in other words, that the prevailing motive always prevails—the question is still before us, Why does it prevail? What gives it the greatest influence? Does it exercise this influence of itself independently? We have already shown that it cannot. What, then, gives it this prevailing influence? It is the free and uncoerced agency of the man himself which determines the influence of the motive, which gives it that influence, and thereby determines the will.
If it still be asked why the mind determines to give to a particular motive a certain influence, and to fix the will accordingly, we reply, the reason is in the mind itself. God has endued us with this power. Without it we could not be moral agents; we could not be accountable; we could no more be rewarded or punished than the earth on which we tread.
We think we have said enough to show that the argument against free agency from the doctrine of motives is fallacious, and alike repugnant to reason, common sense, and Scripture. And whether, in this chapter, we have successfully vindicated the doctrine of free agency from the objections that it is absurd in itself, and inconsistent with the divine prescience, and with the doctrine of motives, we submit to the decision of the reader.
OK, fair 'nuff. Enough particulars of Grammar. I was just tweaking you on the basis of your chosen screen name (well, not entirely... certain glaring errors of grammar are pet peeves o' mine, but mostly I was just funnin').
Beyond the fact that I still find Ralston to be suspect of Spiritual Idiocy (even possibly, outright Heresy) on the basis of his blasphemous botch of John Milton...
...as concerns his cardinal errors regarding God's Prescience, Ralston alludes to it in his first essay:
And Ralston cements his error concerning God's Prescience in his second Essay:
In his contention that, "the taking place of the event is the cause of his having foreknown it", Ralston has simply left himself wide open to being yet another UNTHINKING advocate of Man's Sovereignty over God's Foreknowledge who is easily smashed by "The Hammer of Augustine" -- Matthew 11:20-27.
QUESTION:
True, or False?
How can Ralston possibly maintain the idiocy that "the taking place of the event is the cause of God having foreknown it", when it is precisely the Election of God which DETERMINES what the "taking place of the event" (Man's Choice) SHALL BE???
Ralston would make the Foreknowledge of God a hostage to the Decisions of Man.
But it is the Election of God which determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
I don't have the use of a copy/paste function, so keep that in mind. I just realized something a while ago--that split infinitive I was talking about was actually me ending a sentence with a preposition. (Doh!)
I fail to see how the statement that President Edwards "contends that man is a free moral agent because he may do as he wills, when his will is as unalterably fixed by necessity as the pillars of heaven" is an error. How would the fact that man may 'will as he will' make him free? As to the second objection you have, I believe Ralston is using the term 'foreknowledge' in the proper sense of prescience, which isn't causative. That would be the realm of God's omnipotence.
Finally, as to the Hammer of Augustine, how does God's foreknowledge of events imply causation of said events? In other words, God foreknew that people would repent if he performed miracles in Chorazin, Bethsaida, Tyre, and Sidon; but does that mean that his foreknowledge was the cause? At the very least, Matt. 11 does not touch the issue. It simply states that God foreknew what would happen--not that his foreknowledge caused it to be so.
A Man is Free when he may Will to do what he Wants to do. He is not Free if he is compelled to Will that which he does not Want (slavery), or if his Will is divorced from his Wants (intoxication, demonic possession, etc.).
As to the second objection you have, I believe Ralston is using the term 'foreknowledge' in the proper sense of prescience, which isn't causative. That would be the realm of God's omnipotence. Finally, as to the Hammer of Augustine, how does God's foreknowledge of events imply causation of said events? In other words, God foreknew that people would repent if he performed miracles in Chorazin, Bethsaida, Tyre, and Sidon; but does that mean that his foreknowledge was the cause? At the very least, Matt. 11 does not touch the issue. It simply states that God foreknew what would happen--not that his foreknowledge caused it to be so.
I don't think that you ever noticed what Jesus is saying here. I think that you still aren't noticing it.
The point is that, when God foreknows what a Man will choose in a logically dependent response to one possible Divine Election of Action, and God foreknows what a Man will choose differently in a logically dependent response to a different Divine Election of Action, then it is precisely God's Election which determines WHAT a Man will choose.
With this in mind, look at Matthew 11 once again:
QUESTION:
True, or False?
How can Ralston possibly maintain the idiocy that "the taking place of the event is the cause of God having foreknown it", when it is precisely the Election of God which DETERMINES what the "taking place of the event" (Man's Choice) SHALL BE???
Ralston would make the Foreknowledge of God a hostage to the Decisions of Man.
But it is the Election of God which determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
There's a logically-antecedent factor in Foreknowledge which you aren't even considering -- God's perfect foreknowledge of the different outcomes (including different Choices) which will result from different exercises of Omnipotence on His part.
Since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
This isn't that hard, Gram. Think about the point that is being made.
You seem to be making President Edwards' argument all over again. "Man may will as he wills." Man is not a free agent if the only potential options available to him are the singular options which he inevitably chooses. When man is free, man may choose what he wants as well as what he does not want, or between something which he wants more and something which he wants less. Morally speaking, a free agent is, as Ralston states, "is understood [to be] one capable of acting without being necessitated, or efficiently caused to do so, by something else; and he who has this power is properly possessed of liberty."
I don't think that you ever noticed what Jesus is saying here. I think that you still aren't noticing it.
I'm fully aware of what Jesus is saying here. He is saying that man would have reacted differently had God performed differently. It still does not mean that God's performance in the cases mentioned here are causative, irresistibly 'efficient.' It means that man would have reacted differently than he did in these cases, contingent upon God's performing miracles.
The point is that, when God foreknows what a Man will choose in a logically dependent response to one possible Divine Election of Action, and God foreknows what a Man will choose differently in a logically dependent response to a different Divine Election of Action, then it is precisely God's Election which determines WHAT a Man will choose.
In the sense that God's election is God's choice (not properly the Calvinistic doctrine of Unconditional Election), yes, God's choices in this case determined what man would do. However, this does not mean that God's knowledge of this fact was causative. It would be either man freely responding to God's actions that caused God to know this, or else it would be God's power which necessarily caused the men, were they not free moral agents, to react as they did. Any way we go, though, God's foreknowledge has yet to be proven to be the cause of man's actions.
Actually, I had considered that. I still fail to see how this proves that foreknowledge is causative in and of itself. Does God's foreknowledge cause events to be? If so, then how can God's foreknowledge include possibilities as well as actualities? It can't, because if foreknowledge=causation, then if God foreknows multiple reactions, they are all actual realities, and not potential realities, yet we all know of only one actual reality.
Since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
See my #8 on the Objections thread. God's choices determined man's responses, yet man's responses were contingent upon God's acts, not necessarily effected by them.
It's foreknowledge. God's decree about how an event shall turn out is predestination--God's power is the effective cause of the event. Foreknowledge is simply God's omniscience played out in chronology, and God's omniscience is not the effective cause of an event's occurance. Omniscience/prescience is contingent upon the events, whereas predestination necessitates the event.
What my Pastor and the pastors on the Wesleyan site said was this
IF God foreknows and event he can eithor change it or allow it..eithor way he has assured the event happening..thus it is predestined
Except a clear reading of the scripture says they were causative. IF God had CHOSEN to act differently they would have chosen to act differently .God knew that BUT He chose NOT to act in a way that would change their actions
His NON action was a causitive action
IF God foreknows AN event he can eithor change it or allow it..eithor way he has assured the event happening..thus it is predestined
No, God's creative Election of Divine Action, amongst different Foreknown Potentialities of Divine Action, causes Events to be.
You would agree that, prior to Creation, God foreknows all the differing potentialities of Divine Action available to the Power of His Omnipotence, and all the differing logically-dependent, subsequent, and contingent Events encompassed in each (including the differing Choices which Men will make in logically-dependent response to differing Elections of Divine Action), wouldn't you?
Therefore, since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
If so, then how can God's foreknowledge include possibilities as well as actualities?
Of course God's foreknowledge includes Possibilities. Read your Bible.
Prior to Creation, God foreknows all the differing potentialities of Divine Action available to the Power of His Omnipotence, and all the differing logically-dependent, subsequent, and contingent Events encompassed in each.
Since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
It can't, because if foreknowledge=causation, then if God foreknows multiple reactions, they are all actual realities, and not potential realities, yet we all know of only one actual reality.
No, you have it wrong.
Here, think of it this way:
By this consideration, we see that the Non-Repentance of the Men of Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom become Actualities in the Divine Mind only as a result of God's precedent Elections -- at least two precedent Elections in particular:
Since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
Think it through, Gram. It's not really that difficult.
"Causation" language, in the sense of an irresistible compulsion, isn't even relevant to the argument I am making here. It is enough simply to consider the matter in terms of statistical certainty (that is, 100% perfect, precise, and infallible foreknowledge of the different Choices which Men will make in response to different Elections of Divine Action).
Ergo,
Prior to these Men ever having been born -- God's pre-creative Election to NOT perform the salvific Miracles therein, predestined as an absolute certainty the fact that they would NOT REPENT.
In the sense that God's election is God's choice (not properly the Calvinistic doctrine of Unconditional Election), yes, God's choices in this case determined what man would do. However, this does not mean that God's knowledge of this fact was causative. It would be either man freely responding to God's actions that caused God to know this, or else it would be God's power which necessarily caused the men, were they not free moral agents, to react as they did. Any way we go, though, God's foreknowledge has yet to be proven to be the cause of man's actions.
God's Election to NOT perform the salvific Miracles therein was statistically causative in the sense of predestining ONE result, and not ANOTHER, to ACTUALLY COME TO PASS.
Ergo,
Prior to these Men ever having been born -- God's pre-creative Election to NOT perform the salvific Miracles therein, predestined as an absolute certainty the fact that they would NOT REPENT.
In a sense, you could argue that God's permission for an event 'caused' it, I suppose. However, when I speak of causation, I am referring to God necessitating an event. So, while God's action/inaction 'causes' an event in the sense of contingency--others react based upon His actions/inactions--this by no means implies necessity. They are not irresistibly compelled to act this way; this is the way they choose to act based upon God's actions.
In a sense, yes. It doesn't necessitate the event though, and you will note that the subject of these two chapters from Elements of Divinity has been free agency contrasted with necessity.
You would agree that, prior to Creation, God foreknows all the differing potentialities of Divine Action available to the Power of His Omnipotence, and all the differing logically-dependent, subsequent, and contingent Events encompassed in each (including the differing Choices which Men will make in logically-dependent response to differing Elections of Divine Action), wouldn't you?
What exactly do you mean by 'logically-dependent'?
Therefore, since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
Of course God's foreknowledge includes Possibilities. Read your Bible.
You missed my point. If God's foreknowledge equals pre-ordination/predestination, then each of God's foreknown possibilities is really an actuality, which means that there are multiple actualities, despite the fact that we are aware of only one reality--not to mention that we would "statistically" find that several of these multiple actualities contradicted. (I.E., God foreknows the potentiality that Mary will marry Joseph; God also foreknows the 'potentiality' that Mary will die before meeting Joseph. Because God's foreknowledge preordains what is, and God foreknows that both are potentialities, then both are realities. Mary marries Joseph, and Mary dies before meeting Joseph.)
Prior to Creation, God foreknows all the differing potentialities of Divine Action available to the Power of His Omnipotence, and all the differing logically-dependent, subsequent, and contingent Events encompassed in each.
Well, at least we agree that the events are contingent. Of course, if they are contingent, then they are not necessary; and if they are not necessary, then man is a free moral agent, which seems to be (if I remember correctly--it's been so long since we were on the actual subject and not a tangent ;P) what this and the other recent thread that I started were about.
Since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
Sure. However, God's prescience and omnipotent action do not necessitate these events (you've already admitted that they are contingent and not necessary), which leaves it with man's free agency as to the reactions man makes to God's actions.
Here, think of it this way: 1.) God's Pre-Creative Foreknowledge = God's knowledge of all possible Potentialities of Divine Action (including the differing choices which created Men will choose in logically-dependent response to differing Divine Elections).
Okay.
2.) God's Election = God decides which Foreknown Potentiality (i.e., to NOT perform the salvific Miracles in Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom) He ordains to create, thereby predestining the foreknown Result of that foreknown Potentiality (that these cities will NOT Repent).
In a sense, you could say that. At the same time, God's choice to "create" an actuality from a potentiality is not the necessitating cause of man's actions. Man may still freely choose to do opposite of what God foresees as reality based upon His actions; he won't, however, because he freely chooses to do what God foresaw him doing in the event that God would choose to 'create' an event. (Wow, that sounds convoluted. Nonetheless, the brief of it is that man's moral free agency is still intact. Fine, God chose to do something; however, he did not 'efficiently cause' man to act as the man did in response to God's action. Man chose freely, and despite the fact that God foresaw man choosing as he did, man still had the liberty to choose otherwise as he did. God foresaw, but did not effectively cause, man's choice.)
Since the different outcomes foreknown by this antecedent Prescience (God's pre-creative Foreknowledge of all Creative potentialities) include different choices of men made in logically-dependent response to different elections of Divine action (see #5), we must correctly state that the Election of God pre-determines what the Decisions of Man SHALL BE.
I'll concede that. Even so, God's choices do not effectively cause man's responses in such a way as to make man not a free moral agent.
He is God , not a man like us..so His inaction IS an action
Did God CAUSE Adam to sin..NO , Did He foreknow that sin..of course .. was that sin in His directive will NO ...BUT we have to see it as Gods will because it could only occure if He allowed it to happen ..so in a sense it was a predestined act....one that He wanted to use for His glory ...
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