Posted on 02/15/2008 7:15:07 AM PST by drzz
Captain Thomas B. Weir was the commander of company B, in Captain Benteen’s battalion (one of the three columns that Custer sent against the Indians at Little Bighorn). On June 25, 1876, Weir followed Benteen in his scout on the South of the valley, looking for “satellite villages” (other Indian villages around the main one). __
“WE OUGHT TO BE OVER THERE!”
When Benteen understood that the scout didn’t give any results, he came back on Custer’s trail. He had specific orders to follow Custer’s steps and to send him a note about the results of his scouts. Benteen didn’t send any note to Custer (disobedience of order) and moved on the trail with considerable slowness. He then stopped his column to water the horses at a name later called “the morass”. Shots were heard in the valley, a sign that the battle was beginning on Custer’s side. Private Jan Moeller and Sergeant Windolph heard the firing, as well as Lieutenant Godfrey.
Captain Thomas Weir became very impatient. Lieutenant Godfrey stated that many officers became “uneasy by the lengthy stay. One subaltern wondered why the “Old Man” (Benteen) was keeping them out of the battle for so long. Captain Weir’s anger grew. He said to Benteen: “We ought to be over there!” Benteen ignored him. Weir went to his company, mount up and moved towards the sound of the guns. It was a disobedience of orders, because, as Godfrey stated, “his position in the column was that of second unit.” Benteen eventually moved behind Weir. It was the first time Captain Weir was leaving his command because of Benteen’s indifference to the ongoing battle. It wouldn’t be the last.
_____________________________________________ Sources: Hammer, Custer in ’76, page 75 Hunt; I fought with Custer, page 81. Sklenar, To Hell with Honor, pages 224, 365 note 18
__
BENTEEN’S DAWDLING, WEIR’S TAKING THE ADVANCE
The battle was still on in the valley of the Little Bighorn. However, Captain Benteen’s battalion was still out of the fight. Benteen travelled at three miles an hour, when Custer’s other battalions did the same in an hour less time. Benteen was slow, and there is no explanation for this betrayal. He just acted as if no battle was going on. He just ignored his duty. He then met Daniel Kanipe, who was carrying a vocal order by Custer. Benteen learnt that Custer was asking for immediate reinforcements, but didn’t act at all. His battalion was still moving at trot. He even stopped in front of a lone tepee to examine it. He was wasting time, and didn’t care about it. Soon, another messenger appeared. Private Giovanni Martini was carrying a written order by General Custer: “Benteen, come on, be quick, bring packs.” The packs were not the entire pack train, as it is often stated, but the “extra ammunitions”. Every soldier knew it, as lieutenant McClernand clearly said in his articles and book. Benteen had to pick the extra ammunition up and then to go quickly towards Custer. Did he act as his orders urged him to? Not at all. He didn’t go at a gallop, but at a walk or a trot (Lieutenant Godfrey). Custer’s men had moved on the same ground on overall speed or fast trot. Captain Weir was outraged again. Ignoring Benteen’s orders once more, he moved quickly, left the command and reached Reno Hill the first. Again, Thomas Weir was the only one in Benteen’s troops who acted like a soldier.
_____________________________________________ Sources: Hammer, Custer in ’76, pages 75-76 Gray, Centennial Campaign, page 183 McClernand, On Time for Disaster, page 71-88
__
WEIR’S ULTIMATE MOVE
Benteen’s battalion reached Reno Hill, found Reno’s battalion, which had suffered of casualties after its commander had left it without any bugle in the woods. Benteen dismounted and stayed on the hill with Major Reno. Both never acted to support Custer at any kind. They had orders to “come quick” and knew that the main duty of any soldier is “to support the commander at any level” and to “go to the sound of the guns”. But nothing happened. They just stayed on the hills, while shots and volleys were heard in the valley, coming from Custer’s men.
Lieutenant McDougall testified: “It appeared to everyone that all should go to support of Custer”.
Lieutenant Godfrey wrote: “I thought General Custer was below us and we could join him that we gad no water and a few wounded; that we would have our casualties and burdens increased on the morrow.”
Sitting Bull :
Journalist: “Were not some warriors left in front of these entrenchments on the bluffs, near the right side of the map? (Reno Hill) Did not you think it necessary – did not the warchiefs think it necessary – to keep some of your young men there to fight the troops who had retreated to these entrenchments (Reno’s and Benteen’s men)?”
Sitting Bull: “No.”
Journalist: “Why?”
Sitting Bull: “You have forgotten.”
Journalist: “How?”
Sitting Bull: “You forget that only a few soldiers were left by the Long Hair on those buffs (Reno Hill). He took the main body of his soldiers with him (Custer’s battalion) to make the big fight down here on the left (Medicine Tail Coulee).
Journalist: “So there were no soldiers (warriors) to make a fight left in the entrenchments on the right hand bluff (Reno Hill, Reno’s and Benteen’s position)?”
Sitting Bull: “I have spoken. It is enough. The squaw could deal with them. There were none but squaws and papooses in front of (Reno’s and Benteen’s men) that afternoon.”
Lieutenant Edward McClernand, of Terry’s column, arrived on the battlefield on June 27, 1876. He drew maps of the battlefield and wrote several articles on the battle. Here’s what he wrote on Major Reno, who was the senior commander of Reno Hill: “Some of (Reno’s) officers looking from the edge of the bluffs (from Reno Hill) at the large number of mounted warriors in the bottom below (the valley of the Little Bighorn), observed that the enemy suddenly started down the valley, and that in a few minutes scarcely a(n Indian) horseman was left in sight. Reno’s front was practically cleared of the enemy. It is not sufficient to say that there was no serious doubt about Custer being able to take care of himself. (Custer) had gone downstream with five troops, heavy firing was heard in that direction, it was evident a fight was on (…) Reno with six troops (…) still ignored the well known military axiom to march to the sound of guns.”
Weir was livid. Private John Fox heard this conversation between Captain Weir and Major Reno:
Weir: “Custer must be around here somewhere (shots were heard) and we ought to go to him.” Reno: “We are surrounded by Indians (it’s false. There weren’t any Indian around Reno Hill) and we ought to remain here.” Weir: “Well, if no one else goes to Custer, I will go.” Reno: “No, you cannot.”
Weir was so angered that he left Reno, mounted up and went towards the sounds of the guns with his orderly. Lieutenant Edgerly saw his commander leaving and followed him with the whole company D. As Edgerly understood afterwards, Weir had disobeyed orders. Both Benteen and Reno didn’t want to move.
_____________________________________________ Sources: Hammer, Custer in ’76, page 71 Gray, Centennial Campaign, page 183 McClernand, On Time for Disaster, page 71-88 Captain Michael J. Koury, Diaries of Little Bighorn, page 11 “Wild Life on the Plains”, in Cyclorama of General Custer’s Last Battle, compiled by A. J. Donnelle, Promontory Press, 1889, pages 21-23
WATCHING A BATTLE ON WEIR POINT
Benteen eventually followed Weir, but only 30 minutes after him. The battle was still raging on, as Historian Gregory Michno shows in his book “Lakota Noon.” (he makes the timeline of Custer’s movements with Indian testimonies) Despite what countless books said, when Weir reached a peak named afterwards Weir Point, Custer’s battle was still raging. Little Bighorn specialist Wayne Michael Sarf admits that many officers on Weir Point “apparently saw more than they would later admit. There is little doubt that (Lieutenant) Edgerly destroyed the portion of a letter to his wife dealing with the Weir Point episode.”
Sergeant Charles Windolph remembered what he saw on Weir Point : “Way off to the north you could see what looked to be groups of mounted Indians. There was plenty of firing going on.”
Lieutenant Hare was interviewed by Walter Camp, who wrote: “While out in advance with (Captain Weir’s) Company D, the Indians were thick over on Custer ridge and were firing. (Hare) thought Custer was fighting them.”
Private Edward Pigford: “at first when looked toward Custer ridge the Indians were firing from a big circle, but it gradually closed until they seemed to converge into a large black mass on the side hill toward the river and all along the ridge.”
Captain Weir was watching his comrades battling without helping them, because Benteen and Reno were still on their hill. When Benteen eventually reached Weir Point, he put an American flag on the peak to “show my position to Custer. The bugle began to sound on Custer Hill, which means that Custer was watching the flag or the dust of the other battalions and was using the bugle as a signal. Custer’s men asked for help, after having waited for Benteen and Reno… during more than two hours!
Sitting Bull: “As (Custer’s soldiers) they stood to be killed they were seen to look far away to the hills in all directions and we knew they were looking for the hidden soldiers (Benteen’s and Reno’s soldiers) in the hollows of the hills to come and help them.”
A little band, led by warchief Low Dog, eventually attacked the men on Weir Point while the battle on Custer Hill was still raging (see Michno). Benteen decided to withdraw his troops, according to Private George Glenn and Lieutenant Francis Gibson. The troops fell back without any rear guard, just like Reno had done in the woods. Lieutenant Godfrey decided to deploy his men on his own initiative. He later said to the Reno Court of Inquiry:
Question by the court: “Was the engagement severe in and around (Weir Point)?”
Answer by Lieutenant Godfrey “No severe engagement at all (on Weir Point).”
Question by the court: “Was there much firing on the part of the Indians down at that point up to the time to command started to go back (from Weir Point to Reno Hill)?”
Answer by Lieutenant Godfrey: “No, sir.”
Question by the court: “State if the Indians drove (Weir’s and Benteen’s) command from that position (Weir Point).”
Answer by Lieutenant Edgerly: “They did not. The orders were to fall back and we fell back.”
400 men fell back without ever supporting the last stand. Custer would never have the support he had asked for during more than two hours. His heroic last stand would end at 6.20 p.m., almost at the time Reno had reached Reno Hill again. A betrayal had just happened at Little Bighorn. A betrayal that would be covered during a century, and which is still covered up by many scholars and historians.
Major General Thomas Rosser, cavalry officer during the Civil War, wrote in 1876: “As a soldier, I would sooner lie in the grave of General Custer and his gallant comrades alone in that distant wilderness, that when the last trumpet sounds, I could rise to judgment from my part of duty, than to live in the place of the survivors of the siege on the hills.”
_____________________________________________ Sources: The official recording of the Reno Court of Inquiry, 1879 Nightengale, Little Big Horn, pages 129, 184-185, 190 Unger, The ABCs of Custer’s Last Stand, pages 191-218 Sklenar, To Hell with Honor, page 302 Michno, Lakota Noon, page 233-287 General Thomas Rosser, Chicago Tribune, August 8, 1876
DYING FROM SADNESS
Captain Weir went back on Fort Lincoln with a look of a “broken man” (lieutenant Garlington). He perhaps even tried to commit suicide by jumping in a stream while the 7th was moving back to the fort. Captain Weir was so sad because he knew that his comrades, his friends, his brother in arms had been deliberately betrayed from start to finish. From Benteen’s dawdling to his refusal to leave Reno Hill, from Reno’s disastrous offensive to his cowardice in battle, everything was made to blow any chance of victory up. Captain Weir wrote to Libbie Custer: “I know if we were all of us alone in the parlour, at night, the curtains all down and everybody else asleep, one or the other of you would make me tell you everything I know.” Thomas Weir began to drink too much, and died on December 9, 1876. Cause of death: “melancholia.” The Army and Navy saluted his death:
(Brevet) Colonel Weir was in the prime of life, 38 years of age, and no preliminary announcement of illness preceded the report of his death, which occurred suddenly in New York on Saturday, December 9, of congestion of brain. Colonel Weir was buried on Governor’s Island with military honours on Wednesday, December 14.
The only loyal officer of Reno Hill, one of the greatest – yet not honoured enough – heroes of Little Bighorn, Thomas Benton Weir, was dead. He wouldn’t be at the Reno Court of Inquiry to tell his story and destroy Reno’s and Benteen’s perjuries. On March 22, 1879, Captain Benteen help a journalist to write an article in the Army and Navy Journal. He wrongly accused Weir of being drugs addicted, which should explain his anger towards Benteen and Reno.
Thomas Weir’s ghost still haunted the traitors of Little Bighorn. _____________________________________________ Sources: Army and Navy Journal, December 9, 1876 Army and Navy Journal, March 22, 1879 Son of the Morning Star, pages 284-285
the truth is, Custer achieved a surprise attack on Indians and was on the verge of a victory. However, Benteen and Reno let him alone, never gave him any support and he died waiting for them and trying to protect their arrival.
Custer fought with 210 men, Benteen and Reno waited on a hill with 400 other men.
AS US general-in-chief Nelson A. Miles said to summarize the betrayal of Little Bighorn, no one can win victories when 2/3 of your troops are out of the fight.
Custer was Democrat but voted Lincoln in 1864. He was far from being the kind of cut-n-run liberals we have today. When McClellan’s Democrats advocated for surrender during the Civil War, Custer wrote to his father, a life-long Democrat, that “peace could be achieved but with the bayonnets”
Fox based his researches on cartridges 110 years after the battle, whith relic hunters having picked up thousands of shells before he was born.
His conclusions are therefore bogus.
Historians said that 1’000 Indians fought Custer’s 210 men on Custer battlefield, while ZERO Indian was threatening Benteen’s and Reno’s 400 men fifteen minutes away (at a gallop)
Thank you for your posts.
Question : Crook lost a battle earlier apparently forcing him to stop. Was Crook in violation of orders from Miles to proceed north to support the three point attack ?
Were Crook’s losses ( real and imagined ) so bad that he could not proceed north ? Crook went fishing instead ?
Crook is hardly the first to be on the receiving end of that complaint with similar results.
I have been trying to understand this history better.
Plenty Coups wasn't so sure Crook had chosen a defensible camp on the upper Rosebud on the night of June 16, 1876.
The Battle of the Rosebud was a draw although Crook remained on the battle ground.
Crook's force was left in possession of the battlefield and he claimed a victory, his Indian scouts refused to continue, halting his advance and preventing him from joining up with the 7th Cavalry under George A. Custer, ensuring the latter's defeat at the Battle of the Little Bighorn on June 25, 1876.
.
http://www.footnote.com/page/1209/the-battle-of-little-big-horn
http://www.friendslittlebighorn.com/Archeology-survey-2004.htm
I think there was a topic about this last year. But anyway, thanks george.
Heroism in American History : watch the video
YouTube | custerdivision
Posted on 04/10/2007 10:40:29 AM EDT by drzz
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/1814932/posts
Video: UNITED THEY STOOD
VIDEO | drzz
Posted on 04/13/2007 10:18:50 AM EDT by drzz
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1816759/posts
Watch the video: a look at an American soldier without political correctness (part I)
Watch the video | 04/18/2007 | drzz
Posted on 04/18/2007 1:05:18 PM EDT by drzz
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1819401/posts
Video: US general in chief about the battle of the Little Big Horn
Video | 04/27/07 | drzz
Posted on 04/27/2007 12:23:05 PM EDT by drzz
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1824654/posts
Video: Betrayal at Little Big Horn, the evidence
Video | 05/10/07 | drzz
Posted on 05/10/2007 8:43:50 AM EDT by drzz
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/1831241/posts
Today in history: the battle of Little Bighorn
Custer’s Last Stand | June 25, 2007 | drzz
Posted on 06/25/2007 9:45:11 AM EDT by drzz
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1855862/posts
US History : the Battle of the Little Bighorn in six minutes
Video | 01/16/2007 | custerwest
Posted on 01/16/2008 11:43:47 AM EST by drzz
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/1954654/posts
also related:
Custer Describes the Battle of the Washita
My Life on the Plains Gen. George A. Custer | 1872 | Gen. George A. Custer
Posted on 05/19/2006 3:18:33 PM EDT by robowombat
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-vetscor/1635122/posts
George Armstrong Custer and The Battle of the Little Big Horn
(A South African View)
S.A. Military History Society Journal | November, 1973 | R. MURCHISON
Posted on 06/05/2006 2:09:10 PM EDT by robowombat
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-vetscor/1643759/posts
Your memory is a little faulty in this case, as the battle you refer to was the “Rosebud”, not redbud. Additionally, it was more of a draw then a clear defeat.
You are uninformed.
1. Up to the Little Big horn, Custer had not been a loser and he was NEVER a fool.
2. A junior officer does NOT have the right to disobey an order just because the man issuing it is arrogant. It is their duty to obey. Benteen and Reno failed at this.
3. As to your review of his tactics of that day, you obviously no nothing of Indian fighting. It was common practice to split a command when fighting Indians. A good example would be the Battle of the Rosebud, just prior to Custer’s fight.
4. Prior to this date, the Indian men would put up a delaying action while the women, children and aged scattered. This time, the men put up a very determined fight.
5. Custer, according to many leading authorities, was attempting to get beyond the village to capture the woman and children. If he had done so, the men would have surrendered. If Reno had pushed the attack on the village, Custer would have been able to capture the woman and children. Reno would have lost more men in that fight, but not as many as Custer ultimately lost AND it would have been a victory.
Arrogance had nothing to do with Custer’s actions that day. Based on past experience, his plan was a good one. It was the type of plan that George Patton probably approved - grab ‘em by the nose (Reno) and kick ‘em in the butt (Custer).
Read a few books on the subject and get back to me.
Only from what we had in Command & Staff.
1) IMHO, we disagree.
2) Concur. IMHO, insufficient evidence to justly convict based upon contradictory timelines and when messages were received and corroborated by their peers. Due to the after action reports which were very much influenced by political climates in prof Army service, I have cause to question the veracity of either perspective, so I’ll withhold judgment on condemning the junior officers and survivors.
3) Principles of Warfare as taught from Napoleon to the American Civil War provided ample evidence of the consequences of failing to mass one’s forces at the critical moment of decisive engagement on the battlefield.
4) More critical than the determined fight was the size of the opposing force which was grossly underestimated by Custer.
5) His approach was closer to Janet Reno’s than Reno’s grab their nose and Custer “kick-em-in-the-butt”. Blunder in and get the hornet’s nest all riled up, then blunder in the rear with a split force, insufficiently supplied and reinforced, deploy without any recourse and face the mass of the enemy force which was 10 times the commander’s estimate of the situation, ...viola decimation of the attacking force.
BTW, arrogance was also a known attribute of Patton as well, although his military battlefield career is, IMHO, much greater, better planned, more professional, and well practiced than Custer’s.
The Indians never read about Napoleon. They did not fight like a regular army. As I stated before, splitting up of one’s forces was a standard and successful tactic used against the American Indians. You cannot argue against success.
Up until the Little Big Horn, the decisive moment in any Indian battle was when the army was threatening the woman, children and elderly. If supported properly, it would have been the same here.
You blame Custer for under-estimating the size of the enemy force. Do you also blame him for the fact that the Indians opted to stand and fight this day, and not fight a delaying action? Do you blame him for their change in tactics? Up to that day, the size of the Indian force meant little. They would fight a delaying action and abandon the camp. The Army would burn the camp and kill the remaining horses while the Indians watched from a safe distance. If the Army was able to capture a large group of women, children and elderly, the braves would surrender.
Custer did not blunder in, as you put it. If you had read any books on the subject you would know that. He went in with a good plan - standard for Indian fighting.
Was Custer insufficiently supplied and reinforced? Yes. Was it his fault? No. As the article about Weir points out, Benteen did not bring up the needed supplies nor the reinforcements.
Reno made the odds against Custer so out of balance by retreating to a position that took him out of the fight. Custer had every right to believe that Reno would follow orders. If he had done so, he would have occupied the attention of most of the Indians, giving Custer a chance to capture the women, children and elderly.
I truly believe that you need to read some books on this subject, then you would not make foolish statements like your principles of warfare remark. The West Pointers were taught those principles and the smart ones quickly abandoned them when they encountered American Indians.
You also attack Custer for things beyond his control. You say that he deployed without any recourse. That is not true. He called for Benteen to come to him. He called for additional ammo. Neither happened.
It all boils down to this: The Indians realized that this was their last chance to preserve, for a while, their old way of life. On this sunny day in June of 1876, the Indians decided NOT to run, but to stand and fight. And you blame Custer for that decision!!!!!!
Little Big Horn was indeed a massacre because the hostiles killed all wounded they found, and took no prisoners. They tortured them to death. So let’s hear no more about the noble savages.
My great-great grandfaher was in Weir’s troop, discharged in 1872. He always characterized Custer as a hated leader who unnecessarily rode horses to death and caused desertions. Custer took over commissaries and made profits from what his troopers spent on paydays. He deserted his own command to ride to his wife for sex. He fathered children by Indian women.
Facts
Before Little Big Horn, Custer refused to take: Gatling guns, cavalry reinforcements, and repeating rifles. All three might have helped his troops survive the Battle. He did not listen to his own scouts. He did not rest his men before battle. Custer disobeyed orders by not sending word to his superiors that he had discovered the hostile camp.
Had Benteen followed orders explicitly, he would have continued scouting and missed the battle.
Weir Point survivors indicated seeing hostiles and hearing gunfire. None reported seeing troopers.
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